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Institutionalism and its Effect on Labour Forecasting in Vietnamese Firms 
 
Abstract: This study examines factors that influence firm forecasting regarding their labour expansion in 
Vietnam. Conventional wisdom has it that foreign-owned and large private firms make more accurate 
forecasts since they have more resources and experience than their smaller and state-owned counterparts. 
However, this study empirically shows that state-owned and small firms make more accurate forecasting 
values. There are two possibilities that can explain this counterintuitive result: (1) the institutional 
incompleteness in the post-communist economy and (2) systematic underestimation of their own 
performance by foreign and large private firms, which results from the institutional complexity in Vietnam. 
These unique findings provide valuable information for both academia and practitioners.  
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Forecasting is an important task when doing business (Cassar, 2014) as it reflects organisational learning 
about the surrounding environments (e.g., competition and industry movements). Of the different types of 
forecasting, labour expansion forecasting is particularly important because it strongly affects the planning 
and recruitment of the workforce for future operations (Efendic et al., 2015). Extant literature suggests that 
firm resources (such as finance, human, and management) play an important role in determining forecasting 
accuracy. For example, resources help reduce market uncertainties by facilitating investments in data 
collection, analysis, interpretation, and implementation (Cummings et al., 2006). Entrepreneurs who have 
sufficient resources to facilitate rigorous analyses will likely be more well-informed, able to make more 
accurate forecasts, thereby responding more effectively to environmental uncertainties than those who do 
not.  
Given Vietnam’s institutional complexity (Do et al., 2019), this study draws upon both resource-based 
theory (RBT) and institutional theory (IT) to measure how salient firm resource abundance is to forecasting 
accuracy.  Two variables are utilised: firm ownership and firm size (O'Toole and Newman, 2016). RBT 
states that the resources advantages of foreign-owned and large domestic private (FOLDP) firms may assist 
them in making more accurate forecasts than state-owned and small private (SOSP) firms (Driffield and 
Love, 2003). This study tests this proposition by analysing a large and representative dataset of more than 
100,000 firms in Vietnam. Intriguingly, the study’s findings reject the proposition, finding that it is SOSP 
firms rather than FOLDP ones that are the most accurate forecasters. Given this counter-intuitive finding, 
this study further examines the nature of the inaccuracies made by FOLDP firms. The findings suggest that 
their forecasting discrepancy derives mainly from them underestimating their future labour expansion, 
thereby prompting the speculation that forecasting variation may not be a simple function of resource 
abundance but may also derive from the institutional complexity in which the organisation is embedded.  
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In explaining this paradox, this study draws on IT (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991) to argue that institutions 
may influence business activities by rationalising which activities are legal/legitimate and which ones are 
not. Entrepreneurs/managers are likely to select legitimised activities even if the choice reduces their 
efficiency (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). Thus, although informal institutions (e.g., corruption, and the 
relationship-based principle of doing business in post-communist economies) are not entrepreneurship-
friendly, entrepreneurs have no choice but to accept  these (negative) norms and practices to secure their 
business survival (Nguyen et al., 2018). Furthermore, their cognizance of these unfavourable institutional 
environments may impel them to deliberately set a lower-than-expected forecasting value. 
It is also noteworthy that FOLDP firms with strong financial capabilities may make use of the weaknesses 
of the institutional system (e.g., corruption) to build a back-door relationship with politicians (Du et al., 
2015). This kind of relationship may enable FOLDP firms to create a source of competitive advantage that 
is unavailable to smaller firms and which may be a key tool for boosting business expansion without 
improving forecasting values. Small businesses, being resource constrained, may lag behind their larger 
counterparts in the race to gain political alliances. This inferiority restricts small firms’ expansion and 
therefore their actual expansion does not significantly exceed their forecasting values. 
Another interesting proposition is whether the incompleteness of the post-communist institutional systems 
may influence the accurate forecasting of state-owned firms (SOEs). In contrast to small businesses, whose 
expansion is constrained by external institutional obstacles (e.g., discrimination from state-owned banks), 
the expansion of SOEs is internally constrained in that managers of SOEs intentionally restrict their 
expansion. This behaviour can be influenced by the incentive structure of the post-communist formal 
institutional system, which is not geared up to rewarding the managers of SOEs for exceeding set targets 
(Dana, 1994). 
Thus, IT theory recognises that the growth of firms in developing countries is better understood when 
examined in their historical and institutional contexts (e.g., Nguyen et al., 2018). By emphasizing the 
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institutional environment and its importance to addressing the experience of organisations in a particular 
setting, IT provides a highly relevant theoretical framework that underpins how firm ownership and size 
may influence the accuracy of forecasting. Specifically, accuracy of forecasting is determined neither by 
how well a firm understands its markets nor its ability to anticipate the coming trends, but rather by how 
well the firm can exploit the weaknesses of the institutional systems to achieve its objectives. By 
highlighting that the institutional environment potentially influences the accuracy of forecasting, this study 
is of importance to both management scholars and organisational practitioners who recognise that 
improving forecasting accuracy is a prerequisite for adequate preparation for business expansion.  
Hypothesis Development 
Business forecasting is principally a process of quantifying uncertainties (McMullen and Shepherd, 2006) 
that involves assessing (1) market conditions, business opportunities, technologies, and business landscapes 
that may affect future outcomes, and (2) entrepreneurs’ self-evaluated abilities in dealing with unknowns 
to meet pre-set expectations (Cassar, 2006). While the former is fairly explicit and could be alleviated by 
investing in forecasting facilities, the latter is more implicit, being concerned with entrepreneurs’ cognitive 
self-assessments (Baron, 2007). As such, this study takes into account both RBT and IT to evaluate the 
relative importance of these uncertainties in forecasting. 
RBT proposes that firms abundant in resources are able to make more accurate forecasting than firms 
without sufficient resources (Kapler, 2007). Financial and management resources might improve 
forecasting accuracy by facilitating forecast-related activities, such as data collection, analysis, storage, and 
usage. For example, firms with an Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system can make more accurate 
forecasting than firms without the system (Issa and Kogan, 2014). Experience is also an essential resource 
that can greatly improve forecasting accuracy. Firms with abundant industry experience are exposed to a 
larger pool of information, which is an important input of forecasting activity (Cassar, 2014). As such, RBT 
suggests that resource abundance is positively associated with forecasting accuracy. 
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While resources may reduce market uncertainties by making managers well informed about market 
conditions, their inner uncertainties are influenced by their cognitive patterns, which serve as a function of 
the surrounding institutional settings (Forbes, 2005). IT proposes that entrepreneurs’ cognition is a product 
of regulative forces (laws, rules, and policies) and normative forces (values, norms, and beliefs) (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1991). In post-communist economies, the normative environments are not entrepreneurship-
friendly because the prevailing values are those such as risk-aversion, relationship-based principles, and 
collectivism (Dana, 1994). Moreover, the regulative infrastructure (legislation) is underdeveloped and is 
intrinsically biased against the private sector (O'Toole and Newman, 2016). Also, a weak formal legal 
framework allows local authorities to have substantial room to interpret central laws and regulations to their 
own end rather than for the social good. In such inefficient institutional settings, managers will adjust (scale 
down) their expected growth rates since the perceived transaction costs may discourage them from targeting 
the optimal level of expansion. 
Resource-based theory and forecasting accuracy 
Coupled with the extant literature regarding cut-off points for the degrees of resource abundance, this study 
classifies firms by types of ownership and size (Du and Girma, 2012). Firm ownership may significantly 
influence forecasting ability because each type of ownership has different pools of resources and 
experience. Foreign-owned enterprises (FOEs) have substantial resources to facilitate forecasting activities 
(Blomstrom, 1986), including advanced management skills, appropriate organisation structure, and skilful 
human resource. With a comprehensive set of resources at hand, FOEs can make more accurate forecasting. 
Foreign firms set value on forecasting activities because doing business outside of one’s own country is 
naturally riskier (Gueorguiev and Malesky, 2012). The costs of inadequate preparation and insufficient 
resource reservation entail additional time, efforts, and finance devoted to ex-post adjustments. As such, 
FOEs devote attention to improving their ex-ante forecasting accuracy. 
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To illustrate this further using RBT, it is argued that domestic firms possess fewer facilities and experience 
to conduct rigorous forecasting activities. This is particularly so for SOEs who operate along centrally 
planned ideological lines, rendering forecasting activities redundant (Dang, 2013). Therefore, RBT suggests 
that foreign-owned firms make the most accurate forecasting, followed by domestic private firms, while 
SOEs make the least accurate forecasting. 
This study expects a similar pattern to apply to firm size, which is another popular measure of resource 
abundance. In line with RBT, larger firms are expected to make more accurate forecasting because they are 
more abundant in resources than their smaller counterparts. Also, larger firms possess more experience 
since they position themselves at a higher level on the industry-learning curve than smaller firms do (Du 
and Mickiewicz, 2016). Moreover, large firms are somewhat inflexible and cannot adapt to changes as 
quickly as new ventures can.  It is therefore difficult for them to meet unexpected market demands unless 
these were included in the forecast (Gilliland, 2017). 
In a nutshell, the RBT suggests a pecking order of forecasting ability among different types of firm 
ownership and firm size, whereby forecasting accuracy is positively associated with resource abundance. 
However, this may not hold true in weak institutional environments, such as those in developing countries.  
This is especially the case where the organisation is embedded in an environment with high institutional 
complexity, such as may be found in Vietnam.  
Institutional theory and forecasting accuracy 
The new neo-institutionalism offers non-economic explanations for organisational behaviours (Bruton et 
al., 2010). It thus addresses the irrational decisions of economic agents, which the neo-classical models 
cannot. In the context of this study, it is argued that SOEs may make a set of irrational (i.e., non-optimal) 
decisions that allow them, out of all the types of ownership, to reach the most accurate forecasting values. 
First, rather than setting business expansion goals that challenge themselves, SOEs’ growth targets tend to 
be relatively conservative and easily achievable. Du and Girma (2012) point out that the political, 
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regulatory, and financial institutions in emerging countries are intrinsically biased towards the state sector. 
These (biased) institutional arrangements are designed to provide SOEs with several privileges and 
resources while entailing no additional requirements of performance and growth (Gan, 2009). As a result, 
SOEs typically face inadequate competition pressure, allowing them to set a relatively conservative growth 
rate. 
Second, agency costs, due to ineffective monitoring systems, may also impact the way SOEs’ managers 
perceive the functions of forecasting. The managers of SOEs are inclined to set conservative objectives that 
guarantee they can achieve their pre-set goals at the end of the term (Kalra, 2015). This behaviour not only 
restricts the managers from striving for optimal growth but also discourages innovation and productivity 
within the firm (Girma et al., 2009). As this behaviour becomes more common it gradually establishes a 
norm (practice of doing business) that adversely affects the perceived abilities of the managers of SOEs to 
deal with the unknown (Forbes, 2005). Specifically, the managers who habitually do not pursue optimal 
objectives may lose the confidence in their ability to pursue ambitious goals in the future (Matthews et al., 
1994). 
Third, SOEs have little incentive to surpass pre-set goals once these have been reached because of their 
poor and loose monitoring systems, which primarily occur because of the significant informational 
asymmetries between the owners of SOEs (i.e., the people) and the management (i.e., the assigned officials 
from the central government) (Tong, 2009). These institutional shortcomings pave the way for the managers 
of SOEs to manipulate their powers towards serving their private interests instead of pursuing business 
expansion. This is especially true in the case of the post-communist economies, where the performance of 
SOEs is judged to be best when they achieve the set goals proposed by the higher-level authority (Hoang, 
2016). Thus, the combination of a poor incentive structure with ineffective monitoring systems may restrain 
the managers of SOEs from striving for higher-than-assigned achievements. 
9 
 
In short, SOEs in post-communist economies are inclined to set conservative forecasting values because of 
the incompleteness in the institutional settings. More importantly, the formal institutions do not motivate 
SOEs to overreach their pre-set goals but rather to regard these as a ceiling, even where the opportunity 
exists to achieve higher levels of expansion. SOEs can therefore meet their planned schedule with minimum 
forecasting errors and will even forego business opportunities to do so. On this basis, this study hypothesises 
the following: 
Hypothesis 1: State-owned firms make more accurate forecasting on their labour size expansion than firms 
with other types of ownership. 
Rooted in insights from the IT, it is argued that small firms can make more accurate forecasting than large 
ones. There are several important reasons that help explain this mechanism. First, small firms tend to 
establish relatively achievable goals for their business expansion. This behaviour relates to the informal 
institutions embedded in the post-communist society (McCulloch et al., 2013). Dana (1994) demonstrates 
that Vietnamese entrepreneurs are exposed to values such as collectivism, failure-aversion, and risk-
aversion, and thus they are inclined to be more conservative and less ambitious in setting their goals for 
business expansion. Following this logic, entrepreneurs in such environments tend to set attainable rather 
than optimal targets of business expansion. 
It is noteworthy that both SOEs and small firms are keen to set conservative forecasting values. However, 
the nature of the decision-making may vary between them. SOEs set low growth expectations because of 
the incompleteness in the formal institutional frameworks (i.e., the weaknesses in the laws and monitoring 
systems). Meanwhile, small businesses set low growth expectations primarily because of the unfavourable 
informal institutions (i.e., the communist values and beliefs that are unfriendly to entrepreneurship). 
Entrepreneurs may set a conservative forecasting value because their cognitive pattern is institutionalised. 
In other words, they take a low goal of business expansion for granted because this is the prevailing norm 
of doing business in the economy. They are inclined to accept this conservative practice so as to gain 
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legitimacy for their activities. However, it is argued that not all entrepreneurs’ mind-sets are 
institutionalised; some entrepreneurs’ cognitive patterns may outgrow the scope of institutional constraints 
(Lim et al., 2010). However, these entrepreneurs, being aware of the intrinsic discriminations against 
entrepreneurship in their surrounding environments, are no less reluctant to set a significantly higher goal 
than their conservative counterparts. In other words, whether they do so out of habit or because they are 
more sensitive to the realities of their environments, the net result remains the same: entrepreneurs in such 
environments set sub-optimal objectives for growth.  
Like SOEs, small firms tend to not surpass their pre-set goals. While SOEs purposely maintain their labour 
size at the pre-set forecasting value, small businesses may be impelled to do so because they cannot mobilise 
sufficient resources to support further development. Du et al. (2015) claim that legal discrimination restricts 
the scope of operations in the private sector and that there is insufficient policy support for small businesses. 
Additionally, small firms suffer from financial discrimination that may restrict them from accessing formal 
finance (bank loans). 
Moreover, the entrepreneurship literature suggests that small businesses face age and size liabilities, 
including a lack of track records, insufficient collaterals, and inadequate social and political capital for 
building “back-door” relationships with local authorities (Carreira and Silva, 2010; Du et al., 2015). These 
constraints may restrict small businesses’ expansion to their modest forecasting values. Therefore, unless 
the (legal and financial) institutional environments become more entrepreneurship-friendly, small firms are 
likely to have difficulty in outperforming their pre-set goals. In short, small firms tend to set conservative 
expansion goals due to the limitations of the informal institutions, and they cannot exceed these goals 
because of the limitations imposed by the legal and financial institutions. Therefore, this study proposes the 
following: 




Data and Methodology 
Data 
This study tests the proposed hypotheses using the Enterprise Annual Survey conducted by the Vietnam 
General Statistics Office (GSO). The dataset provides comprehensive and rich firm-level information, 
including ownership and owners’ characteristics, firm employment, capital structure, and performance for 
manufacturing, mining, and service industries. 
In 2012, in addition to the standard survey, there was a supplemental questionnaire concerning firm self-
estimation of their expansion for the coming year (2013). Specifically, surveyed firms were required to 
forecast their next year’s labour size expansion (the percentage growth of the number of employees). This 
information is used to construct this study’s independent variables. 
The GSO Annual Statistics Books are used to collect control variables at the provincial level. The books 
include information about provincial population, consumption power, labour supply, population density, 
and distance from a province to the closest municipal city (business and political centre). 
Variables and summary statistics 
Dependent variables 
The dependent variable of interest is firm forecasting variations with regard to their future labour expansion. 
Specifically, the forecasting variation variable is the difference between the actual percentage growth in 
the number of employees and the forecast percentage growth in the number of employees. Given the seven 
levels of expected labour size expansion specified in the 2012 survey, this study calculates the 
corresponding seven levels of actual labour size expansion using the 2013 data, one year after the firms 
made their forecasts. It is noteworthy that for level (4) – unchanged labour size – this study allows the actual 
change of the number of employees to vary in the range of (-0.5%) to 0.5%; this is a relatively insignificant 
change that allows for the fact that most firms do not maintain the exact same number of employees over a 
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two year period. This setting allows the forecasting variation variable to be constructed, being the pairwise 
difference between the actual labour size and the forecast labour size (actual values minus forecast values). 
The forecasting variation variable takes values from (-6) to 6 as the actual labour size and the forecast 
labour size takes values from 1 to 7. 
Despite its meaningfulness, the forecasting variation variable is of little application to regression analysis 
because of the structure of its values where zero – the middle value – is the most desired (i.e., the best 
outcome). This problem can be resolved by taking the absolute value of the forecasting variations to 
construct the absolute forecasting variation variable. This variable takes values from 0 to 6, with higher 
values reflecting larger forecasting errors (whether these be over- or underestimation). Besides the general 
forecasting variation, however, it is important to distinguish between overestimation and underestimation. 
Therefore, this study constructs the following variables: Overestimation takes the absolute values of the 
forecasting variation variable’s negative values, i.e., converting [-6, 0] to [0, 6]. Meanwhile, 
Underestimation takes positive values [0, 6] of the forecasting variation variable. In general, the 
construction of the dependent variables is summarised as follows: 
<Table 1> 
This study measures labour size as it is more reliable than the financial alternatives (Nguyen et al., 2018). 
Intended labour size forecasting is the expected percentage change in the number of employees between 
2012 and 2013. Employee numbers are typically more difficult to manipulate through accounting tricks 
(McMillan and Woodruff, 1999) and the costs of hiring and firing employees are high in terms of negotiating 
with employees and registering with local authorities (Cooke and Lin, 2012). These attributes imply that 
intended labour size should be carefully considered in all businesses (Efendic et al., 2015). 
Independent variables 
The two independent variables that are proposed have an impact on firm forecasting variations are 
ownership and firm size. Ownership is composed of three dummies: State-owned variable takes value 1 for 
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state-owned firms and 0 otherwise; Private variable takes value 1 for domestic private firms and 0 
otherwise, and Foreign-owned takes value 1 for foreign-owned firms and 0 otherwise. With respect to firm 
size, this study constructs three variables distinguishing micro-firms, SMEs, and large firms, according to 
the Company Law of Vietnam. 
Control variables 
There are factors that may influence forecasting variation, and these are controlled by a set of control 
variables at different levels. At the firm level, this study includes firm age, firm size, operating industry 
(two-digit industry codes), and revenue performance. At the entrepreneur level, owner age, education, and 
gender are controlled since these factors may affect forecast ability (Tran and Santarelli, 2014). Then, 
following Nguyen et al. (2018), this study takes into account factors at the macro-socioeconomic level by 
including provincial labour supply, provincial consumption per capita, population density, and distance 
from a province to the closest municipal city to control for their geographical interactions (Driffield and 
Munday, 2000). Definition and summary statistics of variables are presented in Table 2. The pairwise 
correlation matrix is in Appendix A1. 
<Table 2> 
The table shows that on average, forecasted value is 2.32 levels away from the actual value. Also, the 
magnitude of underestimation is greater than overestimation, indicating that, on average, firms operating in 
Vietnam are overly-pessimistic in assessing their likely expansion. As regards ownership, private firms 
dominate the total business population at 87%, with foreign-owned and state-owned firms each being 7% 
of the total registered businesses. With regard to firm size distribution, 50% of the observations are SMEs 
while large firms account for only 8% of the sample.  The remaining 42% is micro-firms. 
Empirical estimation 
Coupled with the literature investigating entrepreneurs’ growth expectation, this study proposes the 
following specification to estimate labour size forecast variation: 
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(𝟏) 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑔
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑔) + 𝛽2(𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑔) + 𝛽3(𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑔)
+ 𝛽4(𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔) + 𝛽5(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔) + 𝑣𝑗 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡  
where 𝑖 denotes an individual firm and 𝑔 is a province. As such, (𝐴𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑔) is the 
absolute forecast variation made by firm 𝑖 in province 𝑔. The term (𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑔) is a column vector 
of variables including firm age, lagged value of firm size, and lagged value of revenues (as a ratio of total 
capital); the term (𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑔) is a column vector of owner age, owner gender, and owner 
education variables; (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑔) constitute province consumption per capita, population 
density, number of workers over population (labour supply), and distance to the closest municipal city. The 
term (𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔) includes three variables: state-owned; foreign-owned; and private (with 
private being set as the benchmark). Finally, the term (𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔) has three variables: micro-
firms; SMEs; and large firms (the SMEs variable is set as the benchmark). The function also includes an 
industry-specific component 𝑣𝑗, which is controlled by corresponding dummies (two-digit industry codes). 
𝜇𝑖𝑡 is the idiosyncratic error term. For equation (1), the coefficients of interest are 𝛽4 and 𝛽5 as they indicate 
the influence of ownership and firm size on forecasting variation. 
To further investigate the effects of ownership and firm size on overestimation and underestimation, this 
study proposes the following additional specifications: one is the sub-sample of firms that overestimate, 
and the other is the sub-sample of firms that underestimate. These specification settings allow for the 
identification of factors that influence the direction of forecasting variation, which is more meaningful than 
the general absolute variations. 
Since the forecasting survey is one-year cross-sectional data, following Cassar (2014), this study employs 
the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) as the best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE) to estimate forecasting 
variations. The reason for this is the number of categories (seven levels of forecasting variations, from 0 to 
6); moreover, the distance between any two adjacent levels is roughly 10%. These features allow the 
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dependent variables to be treated as continuous variables (Fullerton, 2009). The study makes use of the 
lagged values of firm size and firm revenues in 2012 rather than the 2013 values to reduce potential 
endogeneity-related issues. The regression results are reported in the following section. 
Empirical Findings 
Table 3 presents the regression results. The VIF test shows that there are no significant heterogeneity-
related issues. 
<Table 3> 
In columns 1-3, the coefficients associated with state ownership are negative and statistically significant, 
while the coefficients associated with foreign ownership are positive and precisely determined. This finding 
indicates that SOEs, of the three ownership types, make the most accurate forecasting regarding their 
intended labour size. This evidence lends support to hypothesis 1 that posits that state-owned firms make 
the most accurate forecasting. Regarding firm size, the empirical evidence in columns (1) to (3) also 
supports hypothesis 2, by showing that micro-firms make more accurate forecasting than SMEs and large 
firms do.  
Columns 4 and 5 provide detailed insights to examine the nature of the variation (overestimation and 
underestimation) in forecasting. To assist insightful interpretation, the values of the forecasting variation 
variable are presented in Figure 1. 
<Figure 1> 
Figure 1 enables the plotting of the average forecasting values for different types of ownership. The 
coefficients associated with state ownership are negative and statistically significant in both the 
overestimation (column 4) and underestimation (column 5) specifications, indicating that SOEs make more 
accurate forecasting (fewer forecasting variations) than private firms (the benchmark). As such, the average 
forecasting value of SOEs in Figure 1 should be closer to the zero point than the average forecasting value 
16 
 
of private firms. Meanwhile, the coefficient associated with foreign ownership in the overestimation 
equation (column 4) is negative, but it is positive in the underestimation equation (column 5), indicating 
that foreign firms make less overestimation and more underestimation than private firms on average do. 
This finding implies that the average forecasting value of FOEs is skewed towards the right-hand side of 
Figure 1 (in the underestimation direction). Given that the forecasting value of SOEs is closest to 0, the 
forecasting value of foreign firm must strictly locate to the right-hand side of the 0 value. Also, according 
to the findings in columns 1-3, the average forecasting value of private firms should be between those of 
state-owned and foreign-owned firms (Figure 2). 
<Figure 2> 
Employing a similar inference for firm size variables, it can be seen from the specifications in columns (1), 
(2), and (3) that the average forecasting value of micro-firms should be closest to the zero point as they 
make the least forecasting variation. Meanwhile, the coefficient associated with large firms in the 
overestimation equation (column 4) is negative, but is positive in the underestimation equation (column 5), 
indicating that large firms make less overestimation and more underestimation than do SMEs (the 
benchmark) on average. Given that the forecasting value of micro-firms is closest to 0, the forecasting value 
of large firms must strictly locate to the right-hand side of the point 0. Also, because SMEs’ average 
forecasting value is between those of SOEs and FOEs, as indicated by the results in columns (1), (2), and 
(3), this study has the following result. 
<Figure 3> 
In short, the findings indicate that firms in Vietnam tend to underestimate their forecasting. It is argued that 
this conservative behaviour is a result of the post-communist institutional settings, which are intrinsically 
unfriendly to entrepreneurship. 
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Robustness checks were conducted using ordered logistic regression, financial forecasting, and comparing 
the efficiency of a simple forecasting model with the forecast values of the entrepreneurs. The results are 
found to be consistent with the main findings (results are available upon request). 
Discussion and Implications 
This study investigates why some firms make more accurate forecasting than others. Two contrasting 
theoretical perspectives are proposed that provide insight into the nature of this phenomenon. First, this 
study suggests that resources play an essential role in determining forecasting accuracy. However, 
institutional context could also significantly affect the process of producing forecasting values, depending 
on the reward structure that is provided for economic players. Testing the validity of these theoretical 
arguments using a large dataset of more than 100,000 firms in Vietnam, this study’s findings demonstrate 
that SOEs make more accurate forecasting than other ownership types, as do micro-firms in comparison 
with their larger counterparts.  
Since SOEs are less likely to have the will and micro-firms are less likely to have the resources to invest in 
their forecasting facilities, this study opts for the IT to explain how the accurate forecasting of SOEs and 
small businesses is generated by the incompleteness of their local institutional settings. Furthermore, this 
study distinguishes overestimation from underestimation and finds that non-state-owned and large firms 
tend to under-evaluate their business expansion potential. 
In linking to the extant literature on state-ownership in emerging countries, this study provides a novel 
understanding of SOEs. It empirically evidences that while their behaviour may reduce their forecasting 
inaccuracies, it materially restricts their optimal growth rates. This ineffective behaviour is, however, 
widely adopted by SOEs in post-communist emerging countries (e.g., Vietnam and China) due to the 
planned economy ideology, which is known to be a side-product of the old communism. In the context of 
SOEs, planning accurately and achieving the exact forecasting value is regarded as the best outcome  (Cai 
et al., 2015). 
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Moreover, this study significantly contributes to the entrepreneurship literature by highlighting that small 
firms make more accurate forecasts than large ones. But in the context of weak institutional settings, it is 
argued that this should not actually be considered to be a desirable outcome. While large and old firms in 
the same institutional settings could surpass their pre-set goals, the accurate forecasts of small firms 
should be interpreted as the effect of the resource limitation that is imposed on them. It is likely that small 
businesses cannot achieve higher growth rates even if they want to, being encumbered with institutional 
and financial constraints/discriminations. 
Finally, this study provides several important implications for policymakers. As SOEs make the most 
accurate forecasts but achieve the lowest levels of business expansion while non-state companies 
systematically underestimate their growth potential, governments should adjust the distribution and 
allocation of resources among these economic players. In particular, governments should reduce financial 
and political discriminations against the private sector. Only when the private sector obtains sufficient 
financial capital/political support will they be able to set high growth expectations and be ready for 
aspirational expansion. 
However, it is noteworthy that firms may cope with financial constraints more easily than they do with 
cognitive constraints. The tendency to avoid risks and be satisfied with merely maintaining stable 
performance derives from firms’ embeddedness in negative informal institutions (Fritsch and Storey, 2014). 
This study therefore argues that mitigating entrepreneurial cognitive constraints is not an easy task and that 
governments should focus on boosting governance quality to build trust in society and reduce the 
uncertainties and transaction costs (e.g., property rights protection, corruption controls) in doing businesses. 
Conclusion 
This study aims to investigate the determinants of Vietnamese firm forecasting accuracy. The results 
indicate that state-owned and small firms make more accurate forecasting values than their larger 
counterparts. There are two possibilities that can explain this counterintuitive result: (1) the institutional 
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incompleteness in the post-communist economy and (2) systematic underestimation of the performance of 
foreign and large private firms, which results from the institutional complexity in Vietnam. This finding 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Values of Dependent Variables 
Forecast labour size 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
      
Actual labour size 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
      
Forecast variation variable -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Absolute forecast variation variable 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Overestimation variable 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 
      
Underestimation variable 
      
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Note: Forecast labour size was reported by firms in 2012. Actual labour size is classified into groups using firm 2013 
actual values. Forecast variation variable is the pairwise difference between actual size and forecast value (Actual 
minuses Forecast). Absolute forecast variation variable is the absolute value of forecast variation. Overestimation 
variable is the left-hand-side values of the absolute forecast variation, and Underestimation variable is the right-hand-
side values of the absolute forecast variation. 
 
 
Table 2: Variable Definition and Summary Statistics 




The absolute value of the difference 
between actual labour size and firm 
forecast labour size, across 6 categoriesi 
2.32 1.87 0 6 
Overestimation A subsample of the Absolute forecast 
variation variable: firms whose actual 
labour size is smaller than intended labour 
size 
1.47 1.65 0 6 
Underestimation A subsample of the Absolute forecast 
variation variable: firms whose actual 
labour size is greater than intended labour 
size. 
2.13 2.05 0 6 
Firm age Firm age since establishment 7.04 5.72 1 68 
Firm size Natural log of the number of employees 
(report here the number of employees) 
72.38 313.90 1 9,034 
Firm revenue The ratio of firm total gross revenues over 
total capital 
1.47 2.17 0 14.02 
State-owned Takes value 1 for state-owned firms, 0 
otherwise 
0.07 0.25 0 1 
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Private Takes value 1 for domestic private firms, 
0 otherwise 
0.87 0.34 0 1 
Foreign-owned Takes value 1 for foreign-owned firms, 0 
otherwise 
0.07 0.25 0 1 
Micro-firm Takes value 1 for firms with fewer than 
10 employees, 0 otherwise 
0.42 0.49 0 1 
SME Takes value 1 for firms with more than 10 
but fewer than 300 employees, and total 
registered capital of below 100 billion 
VND, 0 otherwise 
0.50 0.50 0 1 
Large firm Takes value 1 for firms with more than 
300 employees or total registered capital 
is above 100 billion VND 
0.08 0.27 0 1 
Owner age Entrepreneur age 44.02 9.87 24 67 
Owner gender Takes value 1 if male, 0 female 0.77 0.42 0 1 
Owner 
education 
Takes value 1 for doctoral level, 2 for 
masters, 3 bachelors, 4 college degrees, 5 
professional vocational degrees, 6 senior 
technical degrees, 7 junior technical 
degrees, 8 no degrees, 9 others 
4.84 1.97 1 9 
Provincial 
labour 
The number of working population over 
total population by province per year 
0.58 0.04 0.48 0.76 
Provincial 
consumption 
Provincial consumption value per capita, 
in million VND 
34.34 21.07 4.37 68.35 
Provincial 
density 
The ratio of population over area by 
province per year, in persons per km2 
1,336.42 1,310.69 43.83 3,665.63 
Distance Distance from a province to the closest 
economic centre, in km 
110.39 130.12 1 499 
Note: The number of observations is 109,972 firms. Firm-level variables are constructed using the Annual Enterprise 
Survey of Vietnam General Statistics Office (GSO). Provincial level variables are constructed using the Annual 
Provincial Report published by GSO. 
 
Table 3: Regression Results Using OLS 
 Absolute forecast variation Overestimation Underestimation 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Firm age -0.00974*** -0.0129*** -0.0108*** -0.00139 -0.0109*** 
 
(0.00106) (0.00105) (0.00109) (0.00129) (0.00143) 
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Firm size 0.0113** -0.187*** -0.188*** 0.449*** -0.501*** 
 
(0.00498) (0.00684) (0.00684) (0.00835) (0.00837) 
Firm revenue -0.0120*** -0.0140*** -0.0139*** -0.0198*** -0.0103*** 
 
(0.00265) (0.00270) (0.00270) (0.00311) (0.00333) 
State-owned -0.145*** 
 




(0.0248) (0.0294) (0.0317) 
Foreign-owned 0.202*** 
 




(0.0254) (0.0316) (0.0314) 
Micro-firms 
 
-0.762*** -0.760*** 0.964*** -1.840*** 
  
(0.0167) (0.0167) (0.0204) (0.0202) 
Large firms 
 
0.314*** 0.296*** -0.419*** 0.754*** 
  
(0.0239) (0.0242) (0.0308) (0.0316) 
Owner age -0.00486*** -0.00434*** -0.00476*** 0.00127* -0.00810*** 
 
(0.000615) (0.000621) (0.000626) (0.000733) (0.000791) 
Owner gender -0.00720 -0.00581 -0.00847 -0.0154 -0.0127 
 
(0.0136) (0.0137) (0.0138) (0.0158) (0.0173) 
Provincial labour -0.698*** -0.738*** -0.855*** -1.933*** 0.161 
 
(0.212) (0.215) (0.216) (0.247) (0.271) 
Provincial consumption -0.00316*** -0.00200*** -0.00239*** -0.000979 -0.00132 
 
(0.000700) (0.000712) (0.000713) (0.000846) (0.000908) 
Population density -0.000107*** -0.000114*** -0.000111*** -0.000120*** -0.000154*** 
 
(1.02e-05) (1.03e-05) (1.03e-05) (1.23e-05) (1.33e-05) 
Distance -0.000427*** -0.000431*** -0.000394*** -0.000559*** -0.000363*** 
 
(5.76e-05) (5.82e-05) (5.84e-05) (6.96e-05) (7.45e-05) 
F-test p value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
VIF 1.58 1.60 1.61 1.67 1.60 
Observations 109,972 109,972 109,972 62,740 76,408 
R-squared 0.022 0.041 0.041 0.065 0.125 
Note: The dependent variable in columns 1-3 is Absolute Forecast Variation for labour size. The dependent variable 
in column 4 is Overestimation. The dependent variable in column 5 is Underestimation. The estimator is OLS. Firm 
size and firm revenues are one-year lagged values. All specifications include full sets of 2-digit industry dummies and 
9 dummies for owner education. Standard errors and test statistics are asymptotically robust to heteroscedasticity. * 

















Note: The average forecast value of SOEs may locate slightly to the left or right of the 0 point, but it should be the 









Note: The average forecast value of micro-firms may locate slightly to the left or right of the 0 point, but it should be 
the most accurate forecasts. Meanwhile, the forecast values of SMEs and large firms must be strict to the right of the 
0 point.
6 -6 0 
Overestimation Underestimation 
FOEs Private 
6 -6 0 
Overestimation Underestimation SOEs 
Large SMEs 
6 -6 0 




Appendix A1: Pairwise Correlation Matrix 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
AFV (1) 
                  
Overestimation (2) 1 
                 
Underestimation (3) 1 . 
                
Firm age (4) -0.03 0.01 -0.04 
               
Firm size (5) 0.14 -0.06 0.26 0.31 
              
Revenue (6) 0.00a -0.05 0.02 0.12 0.11 
             
State (7) -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 0.30 0.14 0.01 
            
Private (8) 0.00 0.03 -0.03 -0.26 -0.26 -0.01 -0.73 
           
Foreign (9) 0.03 -0.02 0.06 0.05 0.23 0.01 -0.03 -0.66 
          
Micro (10) -0.14 0.01 -0.25 -0.25 -0.81 -0.08 -0.10 0.18 -0.15 
         
SME (11) 0.12a -0.01 0.21 0.17 0.68 0.09 0.06 -0.09 0.06 -0.92 
        
Large (12) 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.21 0.38 -0.02 0.11 -0.24 0.23 -0.27 -0.13 
       
Owner age (13) -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.36 0.19 0.08 0.16 -0.19 0.11 -0.16 0.12 0.11 
      
Gender (14) 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.09 -0.05 0.07 -0.09 0.07 -0.08 0.06 0.04 0.06 
     
Labour (15) 0.06 0.02 0.09 0.09 0.15 0.07 0.13 -0.12 0.04 -0.14 0.14 0.02 0.16 0.05 
    
Consumption (16) -0.08 -0.05 -0.10 -0.09 -0.17 -0.09 -0.14 0.11 -0.01 0.16 -0.16 -0.01 -0.16 -0.08 -0.82 
   
Density (17) -0.08 -0.06 -0.10 -0.09 -0.16 -0.09 -0.12 0.09 0.00 0.14 -0.14 -0.01 -0.16 -0.06 -0.70 0.91 
  
Distance (18) 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.12 -0.05 -0.05 -0.08 0.09 -0.02 0.14 0.04 0.49 -0.64 -0.68 
 
Note: The number of observations is 109,972 firms. AFV is Absolute Forecast Variable. All correlation coefficients are significant at 1% except for those with the 





                                                          
